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Abstract: This paper considers the problem of a monopoly matchmaker that uses a
schedule of entrance fees to sort di®erent types of agents on the two sides of a matching
market into exclusive meeting places, where agents randomly form pairwise matches. We
make the standard assumption that the match value function exhibits complementarities,
so that matching types at equal percentiles maximizes total match value and is e±cient.
We provide necessary and su±cient conditions for the revenue-maximizing sorting to be
e±cient. These conditions require the match value function, modi¯ed to incorporate the
incentive cost of eliciting private type information, to exhibit complementarities along the
e±cient path of matching types at equal percentiles.
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{ i {1. Introduction
Many users of Internet dating agencies such as Match.com complain about the problem
of misrepresentations and exaggerations by some users in the information they provide to
the agencies.1 This problem, and the perception of it among the public, is responsible for
reducing the quality of Internet search and matching and for preventing many lonely peo-
ple from fully utilizing the online dating services, in spite of the advantages in cost, safety,
anonymity and breadth of the reach o®ered by the new technology compared to more tra-
ditional means of ¯nding dates. Although Internet dating agencies rely on individual users
to report information about themselves truthfully and have little resource or capability
of directly validating the information, economic theory suggests price discrimination as a
way of making the reported information credible and improving match quality.2 After all,
self-selection is evident in more traditional meeting places. Night clubs that cater people
with more expensive tastes have higher cover charges. More exclusive singles clubs charge
more for membership fees.
In this paper we look at the theoretical problem of a monopoly matchmaker that
uses a schedule of entrance fees to sort di®erent types of agents on the two sides of a
matching market into di®erent \meeting places," in which agents are randomly pairwise
matched. This problem is presented in section 2. The monopoly matchmaker faces two
constraints in revenue maximization. First, the matchmaker does not observe the one-
dimensional characteristic (\type") of each agent. This information constraint means that
the matchmaker must provide incentives in terms of match quality and fees for agents
to self-select into the meeting places. We refer to the menu of meeting places created
by the matchmaker as the \sorting structure." Second, the monopoly matchmaker faces
a technology constraint that restricts match formation in each meeting place to random
1 See for example The New York Times, Jan. 18, 2001, \On the Internet, Love Really is Blind."
2 Most of the Internet dating agencies in North America, including the dominant companies such as
Match.com, at present charge a uniform fee for all participants. Lavalife.com, an industry pioneer founded
in Canada in 1987, now o®ers a fee schedule based on the number of initial contact messages that a
participant wishes to purchase. This is not the same kind of price discrimination discussed in the present
paper, and is unlikely to solve the problem of misrepresentation or improve matching e±ciency.
{ 1 {pairwise matching. This primitive matching technology allows us to focus on the impact
of revenue-maximization on the sorting structure and matching e±ciency. We make the
standard assumption that the match value function exhibits complementarities between
types. Under this assumption, the \perfect sorting," or matching types at equal percentiles
with a continuum of meeting places, maximizes the total match value and is e±cient. The
goal of this paper is to understand when the perfect sorting is revenue-maximizing.
Our framework ¯ts various two-sided market environments characterized by sorting or
self-selection based on prices.3 For example, online job search has become a major way to
explore potential employer-employee relationships. However, existing job search services
such as Monster.com are plagued by job intermediaries (head hunters) that post entries
only to collect information from job applicants and positions and then pro¯t from the in-
formation. The job market and dating market share a few common features that allow our
framework to apply: match characteristics of market participants can be summarized in
a one dimensional type; participants on one side of the market share the same preference
ordering over matches with the agents on the opposite side; and types are complementary
in the match value function. Other two-sided matching markets where price-based inter-
mediation can potentially play an important role include matching tenants to apartments,
and matching loan applicants to bank loans. The results in the present paper show that
a monopoly matchmaker can have the same incentive as a social planner to implement
the e±cient matching. In this case, the matchmaker makes directed search possible by
creating one meeting place for each type and achieves the ¯rst best matching outcome, in
spite of the technological constraint of random pairwise matching.
In section 3 we show how the matchmaker's problem of designing fee schedules and
the corresponding sorting structure can be transformed into a problem of monopoly price
discrimination. The assumption of complementarity in the match value function implies
that the standard single-crossing condition in the price discrimination literature is satis¯ed
3 A limitation of this paper is the assumption of a monopoly matchmaker, as competition exists in
most two-sided markets. We believe that understanding the monopoly revenue-maximization problem is
necessary for an analysis of price competition in two-sided markets where participants have heterogeneous
qualities and sorting is important. See our companion paper Damiano and Li (2004) for an application of
the present framework to issues of price competition.
{ 2 {for both sides of the market, and results in the incentive compatibility constraint that
a higher type receives a higher match quality. The transformation is then achieved by
combining this incentive compatibility constraint with the feasibility constraint that match
qualities are generated in a two-sided matching environment where agents participate in
at most one meeting place and are pairwise randomly matched in each meeting place.
The outcome of the transformation is a sorting structure in which the e±cient matching
path in the type space (pairwise matching of types at equal percentiles) is partitioned into
pooling intervals and sorting intervals: each pooling interval on the e±cient matching path
represents a meeting place with the corresponding intervals of types on the two sides being
pooled together, while each sorting interval represents a continuum of meeting places with
the types e±ciently matched. We refer to this sorting structure as \weak sorting." In weak
sorting, if two types on the same side of the market participate in two di®erent meeting
places, then the higher type not only has a higher average match type, but never gets a
lower match. Weak sorting allows us to rewrite the objective function of the monopolist
by using a \virtual match value function," which is the match value function adjusted for
the incentive costs of eliciting private type information.
Unlike a standard price discrimination problem, the solution to the sorting structure
design problem cannot be characterized by pointwise maximization due to the feasibility
constraint on how the monopolist provides match quality to the two sides of the market.
In section 4 we provide a necessary condition for the optimal sorting structure to be the
perfect sorting. This condition requires that the virtual match value function be locally
supermodular along the e±cient matching path, that is, have positive cross partial deriva-
tives at equal percentiles. If at any percentile this condition is not satis¯ed, the monopoly
matchmaker can increase revenue by pooling adjacent types into a single meeting place.
Local supermodularity of the virtual match value function along the e±cient matching
path is not generally su±cient for the optimal sorting structure to be the perfect sorting,
because it does not guarantee that a greater revenue cannot be generated by pooling a
large set of types on the two sides. A su±cient condition for the perfect sorting to be opti-
mal is that the virtual match value function is \globally" supermodular along the e±cient
matching path. Intuitively, the inability to observe the type of agents creates an incen-
tive cost for the matchmaker to extract surplus because the matchmaker has to rely on
{ 3 {self-selection by the agents. The perfect sorting structure maximizes revenue for the mo-
nopolist matchmaker if this incentive cost does not dominate the complementarities in the
match value function. In this case, there is no distortion in match quality provision for any
type, in contrast to the standard result in the price discrimination literature that quality is
under-provided for all types except the highest. Finally, if the virtual match value function
satis¯es the stronger condition that it is supermodular over the entire type space (as op-
posed to global supermodularity along the e±cient matching path), then the matchmaker's
revenue is increasing in the number of meeting places created. In this case, even when there
are technological constraints on creation of meeting places, revenue-maximization always
leads to improvement in matching e±ciency.
1.1. Relation to the existing literature
A classical reference in the price discrimination literature is Maskin and Riley (1984) (see
also Mussa and Rosen, 1978). In both the standard price discrimination and our sorting
structure design problems, the monopolist faces consumers with one-dimensional private
information about their willingness to pay, and must provide incentives for self-selection.
In a price discrimination problem, the monopolist controls the quality (or quantity) of
the good provided. Consumers of di®erent types self-select by choosing a price-quality
combination from the schedule o®ered by the monopolist. In contrast, in our sorting
structure design problem the monopolist chooses a partition of the market into meeting
places in which agents randomly match, and the associated fee schedules. Besides the
standard incentive compatibility and participation constraints, the monopolist also faces
additional feasibility constraints because the pair of quality schedules must be consistent
with the sorting structure.
The most closely related paper in the price discrimination literature is Rayo (2002).4
He considers the price-discrimination problem of a monopolist that sells a status good. In
his benchmark model, there is no intrinsic quality dimension to di®erent varieties of the
good, and buyers of one variety care only about who else are buying the same variety. Our
4 We thank Jonathan Levin for alerting us to the paper.
{ 4 {result of weak sorting implies that this is essentially the same price discrimination problem
considered here if one restricts to a symmetric matching environment. His results on when
providing di®erent varieties to di®erent types is optimal can therefore be obtained as a
special case of our necessary and su±cient conditions for the perfect sorting to be optimal.
Inderst (2001) questions the classical result in the price discrimination literature that
it is optimal for the monopolist to o®er low types distorted contracts in order to extract
more rents from higher types. His paper looks at contract design in a matching market
environment with frictions and shows that the distortion result does not hold anymore. In
particular, for low enough search frictions all contracts are free of distortion. The driving
force of the result is that in a search and matching environment reservation values are type
dependent as higher types will generally have more match opportunity and therefore higher
reservation values. In contrast, our no-distortion result does not rely on type-dependent
reservation values, and is generated by feasibility restrictions on match quality provision
in a two-sided matching market.
Our paper is the ¯rst to investigate intermediation in two-sided markets with het-
erogeneous types and search frictions from the mechanism design point of view. In the
existing literature on two-sided search, sorting of heterogeneous types occurs in equilibrium
either because ¯nding a good match takes time (Burdett and Coles, 1997; Smith, 2002),
or because meeting a potential partner is costly (Morgan, 1995). Unlike these models,
our framework is static and we obtain sorting as a result of maximizing revenue by an
intermediary. Building on the two-sided search literature, Bloch and Ryder (2000) analyze
the problem of a monopolistic matchmaker that competes with a decentralized matching
market with frictions. Unlike our paper, the matchmaker observes the types and can im-
plement perfect sorting in exchange for a fee. Due to its information advantage, the only
decision for the matchmaker is what types to service given that their reservation utilities
are endogenously determined in the decentralized market.
The present paper grew out of our previous work on dynamic sorting (Damiano, Li
and Suen, forthcoming). The two papers share the same interest in e±ciency of matching
markets in the presence of search frictions. In both papers, search frictions are mod-
eled by the primitive search technology of random meeting. In Damiano, Li and Suen,
{ 5 {dynamic sorting provides higher types more search opportunities and improves matching
e±ciency. In the present paper, price discrimination by the monopolist creates directed
search markets and can achieve the e±cient matching. In a companion paper (Damiano
and Li, 2004), we use a simpli¯ed framework of the present paper to study how competition
among matchmakers can a®ect the sorting structure and matching e±ciency.
2. The Model
Consider a two-sided matching market. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
two sides have the same size. For convenience, agents of the two sides are called men and
women, respectively. Men and women have heterogeneous one-dimensional characteristics,
called types. The type distribution is F(¢) for men and G(¢) for women. Both type
distributions are assumed to have di®erentiable densities, denoted as f and g, respectively.
The support is [am;bm] for men and [aw;bw] for women, with both subsets of IR+, and bm
and bw possibly in¯nite. A match between a type x man and a type y woman produces
value xy to both the man and the woman, so 2xy is the total match value for the pair.5
We assume that all market participants are risk neutral and have quasi-linear preferences.
They care only about the di®erence between the expected match value and the entrance
fee they pay. An unmatched agent gets a payo® of 0, regardless of type. Section 5 discusses
how our results can be extended when reservation utilities either di®er for the two sides or
are type-dependent.
An important assumption about the matching preferences that we have made above
is that matching characteristics of each agent can be summarized in one-dimensional type.
This simpli¯cation relative to the reality of matching markets, facilitates comparison with
the existing literature, where the assumption of one-dimensional type is standard. Implicit
in our speci¯cation of the matching preferences is that all agents on each side of the market
have homogeneous preferences. For the same price, they all prefer the highest type agents
on the other side. Clearly there are matching characteristics that are ranked di®erently
5 Given our later assumption of 0 payo® for unmatched agents, the payo®s are unchanged if matched
couples bargain over the division of the total match value 2xy using the Nash bargaining solution.
{ 6 {by agents in real matching markets. For example, in online dating, it is sometimes argued
that not everyone wishes to date the smartest person. Rather, matching preferences may
be single peaked. However, when the most desirable match di®ers across agents, the com-
petition among agents is reduced and so are the incentives to misrepresent this kind of
matching characteristics. Since the present paper is about how the monopoly matchmaker
uses price discrimination to mitigate the problem of misrepresentation in a matching mar-
ket, we will focus on matching characteristics that all agents rank identically and compete
for.6
Another important assumption about the matching preferences we have made is that
types are complementary in generating match values. This assumption is embedded in the
match value function xy: each agent's willingness to pay for an improvement in match
type increases with the type of the agent.7 Complementarity is a standard assumption in
the literature on matching. Under this assumption, matching types at equal percentiles
maximizes the total value of pairwise two-sided matches and is e±cient (Becker, 1981)
Formally, for each x 2 [am;bm], let
sm(x) = G¡1(F(x))
be the female type at the same percentile of the male type x. We refer to the pairs of
types at equal percentiles f(x;sm(x))jx 2 [am;bm]g as the \e±cient matching path." We
adopt the speci¯c match value function xy for analytical convenience. Since we allow
the type distributions to be di®erent for the two sides of the market, this speci¯cation is
without loss of generality in so far as the match value function is multiplicatively separable
and monotone in male and female types. To be precise, any match value function of the
form u(x)v(y), with u and v being positive-valued and monotone, can be transformed into
the match value function xy by rede¯ning types and changing the distribution functions
6 Users of online dating tend to segregate into services that cater groups that share the same preferences
for non-competing characteristics. One such example is religious a±liation. Jdate.com attracts only Jewish
users while Eharmony.com targets the Christian population.
7 In online dating, a more attractive individual is more likely to have a successful ¯rst date than a
less attractive individual, so even if both derive the same utility from a given potential match, the more
attractive individual is willing to pay more for an improvement in the quality of the potential match.
{ 7 {appropriately.8 The separability assumption implies that each agent in a meeting place
with pairwise random matching cares only about the average agent type on the other side,
as opposed to the entire distribution. As a result, the monopolist problem of designing
the sorting structure can be reduced to be a one-dimensional problem of match quality
provision. The importance of this assumption will become clear in section 3. We will
brie°y discuss the case of non-separable match value functions in section 5.
A monopoly matchmaker, unable to observe types of men and women, can create a
menu of meeting places with a pair of schedules of entrance fees pm and pw. Each man
or woman participates in only one meeting place. We will restrict each meeting place to
have equal measure of men and women. We assume that men and women in each meeting
place form pairwise matches randomly, with the probability of ¯nding a match equal to 1
for all agents, and that the probability a type x man meets a type y woman is given by
the density of type y in that meeting place. In other words, the meeting technology in our
model is random matching. For simplicity, we assume that meeting places cost nothing to
organize. The objective function of the matchmaker is to maximize the sum of entrance
fees collected from men and women.
The technology side of our framework is modeled on the motivating example of online
dating. Imagine that each meeting place consists of two data bases, of men and women
who have paid the corresponding subscription fees. Any man in the meeting place has
access to the data base of women and can \search" it for a match. We have assumed that
the probability of ¯nding a match is 1 for all agents. This assumption rules out any size
e®ect, which postulates a di®erent probability of ¯nding a match depending on the size
of the market, and allows us to focus on the issue of price discrimination. The search
technology in each meeting place, which is pairwise random matching, is admittedly prim-
itive, compared to the actual matching technology used by online dating services where
agents can search according to the information available on the data base and exchange
further information through anonymous email correspondence. We have adopted the pair-
wise random matching technology in order to focus on the misrepresentation problem,
8 When u is monotonically increasing, the new type ~ x is u(x); if it is monotonically decreasing, the
new type ~ x is 1=u(x).
{ 8 {by implicitly assuming that any information volunteered by participants beyond what is
signaled by their choices of meeting place is not credible and therefore cannot be used to
improve matching e±ciency. The importance and the implications of the assumption of
random pairwise matching are discussed in section 5. Similarly, we have ignored the possi-
bility of verifying certain information by providers of online dating services. For example,
claims of college education in principle can be veri¯ed. Veri¯able information can help
the monopolist extract surplus. In the extreme case where the type information is public,
the monopolist can achieve perfect discrimination through the perfect sorting. In general,
the way availability of veri¯able information changes the conditions for the optimality of
the perfect sorting depends on how conditioning on public information a®ects the type
distributions. We concentrate on unveri¯able information and the consequent problem of
misrepresentation.
We refer to a menu of meeting places as a sorting structure. Let Ám be a set-valued
function that maps any male type x in [am;bm] to a subset Ám(x) of [aw;bw]. The set
Ám(x) represents the set of female types that the male type x men can hope to meet. We
sometimes refer to Ám(x) as type x men's \match set." We allow the possibility that male
type x is excluded by the monopolist matchmaker, with Á(x) = ;. De¯ne Áw similarly,
and denote Á = hÁm;Áwi. For any X µ [am;bm], de¯ne
©m(X) = fyjy 2 Ám(x) for some x 2 Xg:
That is, the female type set ©m(X) represents the union of match sets of male types in
X. De¯ne ©w similarly.
Definition 2.1. A sorting structure Á is feasible if for any x; ~ x 2 [am;bm], y; ~ y 2 [aw;bw],
X µ [am;bm] and Y µ [aw;bw], i) y 2 Ám(x) implies x 2 Áw(y), and x 2 Áw(y) implies
y 2 Ám(x); ii) Ám(x) 6= Ám(~ x) implies Ám(x) \ Ám(~ x) = ;, and Áw(y) 6= Áw(~ y) implies
Áw(y) \ Áw(~ y) = ;; and iii) ©m(X) has the same measure as fxjÁm(x) µ ©m(X)g, and
©w(Y ) has the same measure as fyjÁw(y) µ ©w(Y )g.
Condition i) is analogous to the standard symmetry condition for matching corre-
spondences. It states that if type x men are participating in a meeting place where there
{ 9 {are type y women, then type y women are participating in a meeting place where there
are type x men, and vice versa. This condition is needed for a meeting place to have the
interpretation of a matching market. Condition ii) requires that each type participates in
at most one meeting place. This simpli¯es the analysis. Condition iii) requires that each
meeting place consists of men and women of equal measures. This ensures that match
probability is one for each agent in any meeting place. This condition helps us minimize
the role of search technologies and focus on the impact of revenue-maximization on the
sorting structure and matching e±ciency.
3. Weak Sorting
The monopolist's problem is to choose a sorting structure and the corresponding two fee
schedules, one for males and one for females. A sorting structure assigns to each male type
a set of potential female matches and to female types a set of potential male partners. The
design problem appears multi-dimensional because what a type buys from the matchmaker
is a type distribution on the other side of the meeting place. However, the assumption of
a multiplicatively separable match value function allows us to reduce the problem to one
dimension. Our ¯rst step of analysis is to substitute a pair of expected match types for
each meeting place in the design problem, and transform the market design problem to a
more familiar price discrimination problem.
A feasible sorting structure Á generates two schedules of expected match types, qm
and qw. The function qm : [am;bm] ! [aw;bw][f0g assigns to each male type the expected
value of his match; the function qw : [aw;bw] ! [am;bm][f0g is the corresponding function
for female types. We refer to q = hqm;qwi as a pair of \quality schedules." Given Á, we
obtain qm and qw as9
qm(x) = E[yjy 2 Ám(x)];
qw(y) = E[xjx 2 Áw(y)]
(3:1)
9 Without the restrictions of types participating in at most one meeting place, Á would not be su±cient
to de¯ne qm and qw and we would need additional notation to specify the fraction of agents of a given
type who participate in any given meeting place.
{ 10 {for all x 2 [am;bm] such that Ám(x) 6= ; and y 2 [aw;bw] such that Áw(y) 6= ;. We
adopt the convention that if any type is excluded by the matchmaker, the match quality
assignment is 0, which is the reservation utility. For notational simplicity all the lemmas in
the remainder of this section refer to types that are served by the monopoly matchmaker.
With the convention we have adopted, the lemmas can be easily restated to cover the
excluded types.
As in a price discrimination problem, the monopolist does not observe agent types and
must rely on self-selection of agents into their assigned expected match quality.10 Given
equations (3.1), we can now formally state the optimal mechanism design problem of the
matchmaker. Let pm(x) be the participation fee for type x and de¯ne pw(y) similarly;
denote p = hpm;pwi. The monopolist chooses a feasible sorting structure Á and a pair of







subject to incentive compatibility constraints
xqm(x) ¡ pm(x) ¸ xqm(~ x) ¡ pm(~ x);
yqw(y) ¡ pw(y) ¸ yqw(~ y) ¡ pw(~ y)
for all x; ~ x 2 [am;bm] and y; ~ y 2 [aw;bw] respectively, and participation constraints
xqm(x) ¡ pm(x) ¸ 0;
yqw(y) ¡ pw(y) ¸ 0
for all x 2 [am;bm] and y 2 [aw;bw] respectively, where q is given in (3.1).
Under the complementarity assumed in the match value function, standard arguments
imply that qm being nondecreasing is necessary for the incentive compatibility constraints
for men to be satis¯ed (see, e.g., Maskin and Riley, 1984). Further, the associated indirect
utility Um(x) of male type x, de¯ned as
Um(x) = xqm(x) ¡ pm(x);
10 Since the matching market is two-sided, self-selection involves a coordination problem that is absent
in a standard price discrimination problem. We ignore such problem in this paper by assuming that the
monopoly matchmaker can decide how agents self-select so long as the sorting structure is feasible and
incentive compatible. See our companion paper (Damiano and Li, 2004) for a discussion of how to resolve
the coordination problem.
{ 11 {satis¯es the envelope condition
U0
m(x) = qm(x): (3:2)
at every x such that qm(x) is continuous. Finally, condition (3.2) and the monotonicity
of qm together are su±cient for incentive compatibility. Similar observations hold for
monotonicity of qw and the indirect utility function Uw of women.
Unlike in a typical price discrimination problem, the monopolist can only choose
schedules qm and qw consistent with some feasible sorting structure. Through a series of
lemmas, we show how the feasibility constraints on the sorting structure translate into
direct restrictions on quality schedules. Take a pair of nondecreasing quality schedules q.
Monotonicity of the schedules leads to the following de¯nition.11
Definition 3.1. An interval Tm µ [am;bm] is a maximal pooling interval under qm if
qm(¢) is constant on Tm, and there is no interval T0
m ¾ Tm such that qm(¢) is constant on
T0
m.
Maximal pooling intervals Tw under qw can be similarly de¯ned. We say that q =
hqm;qwi is \feasible" if there is a feasible Á = hÁm;Áwi such that equations (3.1) are
satis¯ed for almost all x and y. We call Á the \associated" sorting structure.
Lemma 3.2. If q is feasible, then for any maximal pooling interval Tm under qm and any
associated sorting structure Á, ©m(Tm) is a maximal pooling interval under qw.
Proof. Suppose ©m(Tm) is not a maximal pooling interval under qw. There are two
cases.
Case 1. Suppose that qw is not constant on ©m(Tm). Then, we can ¯nd y; ~ y 2 ©m(Tm) such
that qw(y) < qw(~ y). It follows from condition ii) in De¯nition 2.1 that Áw(y) \ Áw(~ y) = ;
and ©m(Áw(y)) \ ©m(Áw(~ y)) = ;. Since Tm is a maximal pooling interval and y; ~ y 2
©m(Tm), we have
E[tjt 2 ©m(Áw(y))] = E[tjt 2 ©m(Áw(~ y))];
11 There is no need to specify whether a maximal pooling interval contains the two end points. The
assignment of values of qm and qw to the end points does not a®ect the revenue function stated later in
Proposition 3.6.
{ 12 {which is possible only if
inf ©m(Áw(~ y)) < sup©m(Áw(y)):
Then, there exist y1 2 ©m(Áw(y)) and ~ y1 2 ©m(Áw(~ y)) such that y1 > ~ y1. It follows
that qw(y1) = qw(y) < qw(~ y) = qw(~ y1), which contradicts the assumption that qw is
nondecreasing.
Case 2. Suppose that there is a W ¾ ©m(Tm) such that qw is constant on W. By a
symmetric argument as in Case 1, we can show that qm is constant on ©w(W). Since
W ¾ ©m(Tm), we can write
©w(W) = ©w(©m(Tm)) [ ©w(W n ©m(Tm)):
We claim that ©w(©m(Tm)) ¶ Tm: if x 2 Tm, then there exists y 2 ©m(Tm) such that
y 2 Ám(x), which by condition i) of De¯nition 2.1 implies that x 2 Áw(y), and therefore
x 2 ©w(©m(Tm)). Further, ©w(W n ©m(Tm)) 6= ; because W ¾ ©m(Tm), and qw is
constant and di®erent from 0 on W. Finally, ©w(W n ©m(Tm)) \ Tm = ;, because y 62
©m(Tm) implies that Áw(y) \ Tm 6= ; by condition i) of De¯nition 2.1. It follows that
©w(W) ¾ Tm. Since qm is constant over ©w(W), we have reached a contradiction to the
assumption that Tm is a maximal pooling interval under qm. Q.E.D.
By symmetry, if a pair of nondecreasing schedules q is feasible, then ©w(Tw) is a
maximal pooling interval under qm for any maximal pooling interval Tw under qw and any
associated sorting structure Á. A corollary of Lemma 3.2 is thus ©w(©m(Tm)) = Tm, and
symmetrically ©m(©w(Tw)) = Tw. Another implication is that for any associated sorting
structure Á, and for any maximal pooling interval Tm under qm, we have qm(x) = E[yjy 2
©m(x)] for all x 2 Tm.12 Symmetrically, for any maximal pooling interval Tw under qw
and for any y 2 Tw, we have qw(y) = E[xjx 2 ©w(Tw)].
Lemma 3.2 is the ¯rst step in showing that a pair of nondecreasing, feasible schedules




l=1 of maximal pooling intervals in [am;bm] and
12 In general, it is not true that Ám(x) = ©m(Tm) for all x 2 Tm, as there can be more than one way




E[yjy 2 Ám(x)] dF(x)(F(sup(Tm)¡F(inf(Tm)))E[yjy 2 ©m(Tm)]. Since E[yjy 2 Ám(x)]
equals qm(x) and is constant on Tm, it follows that qm(x) = E[yjy 2 ©m(Tm)] for all x 2 Tm.




w) for each l. The next step is to
identify the end points of each maximal pooling interval.
Lemma 3.3. If q is feasible, then for any maximal pooling interval Tm under qm and any
associated sorting structure Á, sm(inf Tm) = inf ©m(Tm) and sm(supTm) = sup©m(Tm).
Proof. We ¯rst establish that if x < inf Tm then supÁm(x) · inf ©m(Tm). To prove
this claim by contradiction, suppose that there exists y > inf ©m(Tm) such that y 2
Ám(x). Since Tm is a maximal pooling interval and x 62 Tm, we have Ám(x) \ ©m(Tm) =
;. By Lemma 3.2, ©m(Tm) is an interval and hence y ¸ sup©m(Tm). If inf Ám(x) ¸
sup©m(Tm), then since qm(x) = E[yjy 2 Ám(x)] and x < inf Tm, we have a contradiction
to the assumption that qm is nondecreasing. If instead inf Ám(x) · inf ©m(Tm), then
there exists ~ y 2 Ám(x) such that ~ y · inf ©m(Tm). By condition ii) of De¯nition 2.1
and the de¯nition of qw we have qw(y) = qw(~ y). Monotonicity of qw implies that qw is
constant on [~ y;y] ¾ ©m(Tm) therefore ©m(Tm) is not a maximal pooling interval under
qw, contradicting Lemma 3.2.
It follows from the above claim that Ám(x) µ ©m([am;inf Tm)) for any x < inf Tm,













G(inf ©m(Tm)) ¸ F(inf Tm):
By a symmetric argument, we have supÁw(y) · inf Tm for any y < inf ©m(Tm).
Hence, [am;inf Tm] ¶ ©w([aw;inf ©m(Tm))) and
F(inf Tm) ¸ G(inf ©m(Tm)):
It follows that G(inf ©m(Tm)) = F(inf Tm), which by the de¯nition of sm implies that
sm(inf Tm) = inf ©m(Tm).
{ 14 {The argument for sm(supTm) = sup©m(Tm) is symmetric. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3 completely characterize a nondecreasing, feasible q for x
and y in maximal pooling intervals. It remains to characterize qm(x) and qw(y) for any x
and y not in a maximal pooling interval respectively.
Lemma 3.4. If q is feasible, then qm(x) = sm(x) for any x 2 [am;bm] such that x does
not belong to any maximal pooling interval under qm.
Proof. Fix any sorting structure Á associated with q. We ¯rst show that, if x does
not belong to any maximal pooling interval, Ám(x) is a singleton. Suppose y; ~ y 2 Ám(x)
for some y < ~ y: By condition ii) of De¯nition 2.1, Áw(y) = Áw(~ y), and qw(y) = qw(~ y).
Since qw is monotone, it must be constant on the interval [y; ~ y]. Therefore, there exists
a maximal pooling interval W ¶ [y; ~ y]. By construction, x belongs to ©w(W) which is a
maximal pooling interval by Lemma 3.2; a contradiction.
Let Ám(x) = fyxg. Since qm(x) = E[yjy 2 Ám(x)], we can write qm(x) = yx. By
monotonicity of qm, if ~ x < x and ~ x does not belong to a maximal pooling interval then
y~ x · yx where Ám(~ x) = fy~ xg. Together with Lemma 3.3, this implies that ©m[am;x] µ
[aw;Ám(x)]. Clearly, yx does not belong to a maximal pooling interval under Áw and
Áw(yx) = fxg, so an identical argument yields ©w[aw;yx] µ [am;x]. Then, by condition
iii) in De¯nition 2.1, we have F(x) = G(yx), or qm(x) = yx = sm(x). Q.E.D.
The following proposition summarizes the feasibility restrictions on incentive compati-
ble quality schedules that we have derived from the restrictions imposed on feasible sorting
structure (De¯nition 2.1). For the ease of notation, for any am · x < ~ x · bm, let
¹m(x; ~ x) = E[tjx · t · ~ x]
be the mean male type on the interval [x; ~ x]. De¯ne ¹w(y; ~ y) similarly.
Proposition 3.5. A pair of nondecreasing quality schedules hqm;qwi is feasible if and
only if i) for any maximal pooling interval Tm under qm and each x 2 Tm, qm(x) =
¹w(sm(inf Tm);sm(supTm)) and qw(sm(x)) = ¹m(inf Tm;supTm); and ii) for any x not in
any maximal pooling interval under qm, qm(x) = sm(x) and qw(sm(x)) = x.
{ 15 {Proof. Necessity of i) and ii) follow immediately from Lemmas 3.2{3.4. For su±ciency,
¯x any q that is nondecreasing and feasible. For each maximal pooling interval Tm under
qm, construct the set-valued function Ám such that Ám(x) = [sm(inf Tm);sm(supTm)] for
any x in the closure of Tm, and correspondingly Áw such that Áw(y) = [inf Tm;supTm] for
any y 2 [sm(inf Tm);sm(supTm)]. For all other x, let Ám(x) = fsm(x)g and Áw(sm(x)) =
fxg. By conditions i) and ii) stated in the proposition, Ám(x) and Áw(y) are well-de¯ned
for all x 2 [am;bm] and y 2 [aw;bw] respectively, and further, Ám and Áw satisfy equations
(3.1) for almost all x and y. Thus, hqm;qwi is feasible. Q.E.D.
The above result can be viewed as a characterization of any feasible sorting structure
associated with an incentive compatible, feasible pair of quality schedules. We refer to the
characterization as \weak sorting." Since meeting places are mutually exclusive in type, in
weak sorting if two types on the same side the market participate in two di®erent meeting
places, then the higher type not only has a higher average match type, but never gets a
lower match.
We have completed transforming the design problem from choosing a feasible and
incentive compatible sorting structure Ám and Áw to a problem of choosing a pair of non-
decreasing quality schedules that satisfy Proposition 3.5. The advantage of this transfor-
mation is that from the mechanism design literature we know how to manipulate the incen-
tive compatibility and individual rationality constraints associated with one-dimensional
schedules q to rewrite the matchmaker's revenue. De¯ne




Jw(y) = y ¡
1 ¡ G(y)
g(y)
to be the \virtual type" for male type x and female type y respectively. Virtual type
of x takes into account the incentive cost of eliciting private type information from type
x. These are familiar de¯nitions from the standard price discrimination literature (e.g.,
Myerson, 1981). Next, we combine the virtual types and de¯ne
K(x;y) = xJw(y) + yJm(x) (3:3)
{ 16 {as the \virtual match value" for male type x and female type y. Virtual match value of
types x and y is based on the match value between x and y with proper adjustment of the
incentive costs of eliciting truthful information from the two types.
For the following proposition, note that for any q that is nondecreasing and feasible,
there are at most countable many maximal pooling intervals. This is because for any
maximal pooling interval Tm, the quality schedule qm is discontinuous at inf Tm (unless
inf Tm = am) and supTm (unless supTm = bm). Since qm is monotone, it can only have
a countable number of discontinuities. Let L be the total number of maximal pooling
intervals under qm; note that we allow L to be in¯nite.
Proposition 3.6. Fix a pair of nondecreasing and feasible quality schedules hqm;qwi.
De¯ne cm = inffx : qm(x) > 0g, and let fTl
mgL
l=1 be the collection of all maximal pooling

























Thus, incentive compatibility and feasibility of the quality schedules imply that the
monopoly matchmaker's exclusion policy takes the form of a cuto® male type cm 2 [am;bm]
such that male types x < cm and female types y < sm(cm) are excluded. Given our
characterization of incentive compatible, feasible quality schedules in Proposition 3.5, the
proof of the above proposition follows the standard steps of integration by parts and
application of the envelope conditions (3.2). More precisely, using the de¯nition of the
indirect utility function Um, we can write the total revenue from the male side as
Z bm
cm






Um(x) d(1 ¡ F(x)):
After integration by parts for the second term above, we can use (3.2) and the de¯nition
of virtual type function Jm to rewrite the revenue from the male side as




{ 17 {The revenue from the female side can be similarly stated. The cuto® types cm and sm(cm)
receive their reservation utility of 0 in any optimal price discrimination mechanism for the
monopolist. The revenue formula (3.4) in Proposition 3.6 then follows from equation (3.3)
and the characterization result of Proposition 3.5.
Proposition 3.6 restates the original sorting structure design problem given at the
beginning of this section as choosing quality schedules q. We note that there are two
components in the restated maximization problem: one is the exclusion policy or choosing
cm, and the other is the optimal sorting problem for a given cm, which is the focus of
the present paper. The necessary and su±cient conditions for the perfect sorting to be
revenue-maximizing, derived in the next section, are a characterization of the optimal
sorting problem.
The objective function of the optimal sorting problem is given by the revenue for-
mula (3.4). The formula contains two terms, corresponding respectively to the revenue
from the types that are perfectly sorted and the revenue from a sequence of pooling re-
gions. The revenue from perfectly sorting the types in a region (x1;x2)£(sm(x1);sm(x2))
is the integral of the virtual match value function K along the e±cient matching path
f(x;sm(x))jx 2 (x1;x2)g, while the revenue from pooling the types in a region Tl
m£©m(Tl
m)
is the integral of the virtual match value function over the entire region. Note that the
quality schedule q does not appear explicitly in the revenue formula; by Proposition 3.5,
the feasibility constraint on q, together with the incentive compatibility constraint, has
already pinned down q once the sequence of maximal pooling intervals fTl
mgL
l=1 is given.
Thus, the monopolist's optimal sorting problem is reduced to choosing the break points
of the maximal pooling intervals.13 We can think of the monopolist partitioning the set
of serviced male types [cm;bm] into a sequence of pooling intervals and sorting intervals,
with the set of serviced female types correspondingly partitioned. Since the revenue is
written as sum of revenues from these intervals in the formula of Proposition 3.6, whether
it is optimal to pool or to sort the types in one particular interval can be determined in
isolation. This feature will be repeatedly used in the analysis of the next section.
13 By de¯nition two sorting intervals cannot be adjacent to each other. However, it is possible, and
may even be optimal, to have two pooling intervals adjacent to each other.
{ 18 {4. Perfect Sorting
Proposition 3.5 establishes weak sorting as the outcome of satisfying both the incentive
compatibility constraint in self-selection and the feasibility constraint on the sorting struc-
ture. Weak sorting can take di®erent forms, from pooling the entire population of agents
into a single meeting place to segregating each type into separate meeting places. Due to
the assumption of complementarity in the match value function xy, the ¯ner the agents
are partitioned into separate meeting places, the higher the matching e±ciency in terms of
the total match value.14 The question is whether the monopoly's revenue is also increased.
In this section, we use the revenue formula of Proposition 3.6 to study the implica-
tions of revenue maximization to the sorting structure and matching e±ciency. We are
particularly interested in the perfect sorting structure. If the perfect sorting maximizes
the monopolist's revenue, then the monopolist has the same incentive to create meeting
places as a social planner who maximizes the total match value. In this case, the incentive
cost of eliciting private type information generates no distortion in terms of match quality
provision. This is in contrast with the standard price discrimination result that quality
is under-provided for all types but the very highest (Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Maskin and
Riley, 1984). The standard result is commonly explained in terms of the tradeo® between
\e±ciency" and rent extraction: e±ciency for a given type means a quality level that
maximizes the trade surplus, de¯ned as the type's utility of consuming the quality less the
cost of producing it, but the price function that implements the e±cient quality schedule
leaves too much rent to types. This tradeo® is resolved by a downward distortion of the
quality level for all types except the highest. In contrast, in our model the tradeo® be-
tween e±ciency and rent extraction is not resolved by the monopolist's quality decisions,
as these decisions are determined by the feasibility constraints (equations 3.1) once the
sorting structure is chosen.
Before proceeding with the main analysis, we note that there are two aspects of the
e±cient matching. In order to maximize the total match value, the monopolist not only
14 Although this statement is intuitively obvious, we are not aware of a direct proof in the existing
literature. Proposition 4.4 below provides such a proof. McAfee (2002) shows that a relatively large
e±ciency gain can be made by optimally splitting one market into two.
{ 19 {needs to create a continuum of meeting places to implement the perfect sorting, but also
needs to have the same exclusion policy as the planner. By assumption, the match value of
any pair of types is positive and the reservation utility of each type is zero, implying that
the planner will have full market coverage (i.e., every type is matched by the planner.)
In contrast, the virtual match value of a pair of types need not be positive, and so the
monopolist may ¯nd it optimal to exclude some types. The focus of the present paper is
when the revenue-maximizing sorting structure is the perfect sorting. This can be studied
independently of the exclusion policy. The analysis below may be viewed as characterizing
necessary and su±cient conditions for the optimality of the perfect sorting for any given
exclusion policy.
4.1. Necessary condition
In a simple price-quality discrimination problem, where the trade surplus equals the prod-
uct of the quality and the type less the cost of producing the quality, one presumes full
separation of types, drops the monotonicity constraint on the quality schedule, and chooses
a quality level to maximize the \virtual surplus" for each type, which is the trade surplus
with the virtual type in place of the type. This pointwise maximization method can-
not be applied in our mechanism design problem, because the quality schedules here are
constrained by the choice of the feasible sorting structure through Proposition 3.5. For
example, assuming full separation of types in our problem would uniquely determine the
quality schedules as qm(x) = sm(x) and qw(y) = sw(y). Instead of pointwise maximiza-
tion, we use a local approach to identify a necessary condition for the perfect sorting to
be optimal. The idea is simple.15 We start with the revenue from the perfect sorting
15 Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2001) use the same techniques to answer the question of how much
private information an auctioneer should allow the bidder to learn about his valuation. The analogy
between our sorting structure design problem and theirs can be seen if one thinks of a partition element
in an information structure in their paper as a pooling of types in our problem. There are at least two
important technical di®erences. First, in Bergemann and Pesendorfer types do not know who they are in
a partitional element of an information structure and form expectations about their types, with all types
in the element sharing the same expectation. This implies that the important incentive compatibility
constraint is the one for the conditional average type. In our problem agents know their types, so the
relevant incentive compatibility constraint for all types in a pooling meeting place is that for the lowest
type. Second, we have an additional constraint in the revenue maximization problem that the quality
schedules must be generated from a feasible sorting structure.
{ 20 {and study how it changes when we pool types in a small neighborhood around a point
along the e±cient matching path while keeping all other types separated. We then let the
neighborhood become arbitrarily small.
Start with the quality schedules under the perfect sorting s = hsm;swi, where sw
denotes the inverse of sm. For some t 2 (am;bm) and a small positive ², construct a new
pair of quality schedules q(²) by pooling the male types on the interval [t;t + ²] with the
female types on the corresponding interval [sm(t);sm(t + ²)], while retaining the perfect
sorting structure outside the region [t;t + ²] £ [sm(t);sm(t + ²)]. Let ¢t(²) be the revenue
di®erence between s and q(²). We note that q(²) is nondecreasing by construction, and
feasible because it satis¯es Proposition 3.5. Thus, we can apply the revenue formula of










F(t + ²) ¡ F(t)
:
We will study the behavior of ¢t(²) for ² ! 0. In the following lemma, K12 is the cross
partial derivative of K. The proof is in the appendix.
Lemma 4.1. ¢t(0) = ¢0
t(0) = ¢00
t (0) = 0, and ¢000
t (0) = 1
2K12(t;sm(t))f(t)s0
m(t).
The next proposition follows immediately from the above lemma and gives a necessary
condition for the perfect sorting to be optimal. This condition requires that the virtual
match value function has nonnegative cross partial derivative along the e±cient matching
path f(x;sm(x))jx 2 [am;bm]g. For any x 2 (am;bm), we say that K satis¯es \local path
supermodularity" (local PS) at x if K12(x;sm(x)) ¸ 0. The relation between local PS
and supermodularity will be discussed later. If local PS is not satis¯ed at some point on
the e±cient matching path, then the continuity of ¢t(²) implies that there exists an ² > 0
such that the monopoly matchmaker can increase revenue by pooling male types in [t;t+²]
and corresponding female types in [sm(t);sm(t+²)] into a single meeting place, instead of
perfectly sorting these types.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that K12(x;sm(x)) < 0 for some x 2 (am;bm). Then, any
nondecreasing, feasible pair of quality schedules such that x does not belong to the closure
of a maximal pooling interval is non-optimal.




In the special case where the two sides of the market have the same type distributions,
with sm(x) = x, the condition in Proposition 4.2 boils down to the virtual type function
being nondecreasing. With asymmetric distributions, monotonicity of the virtual types on
both male and female sides is not required, though for the perfect sorting to be optimal,
at any point along the e±cient matching path at least one side must have nondecreasing
virtual type. Further, the local PS condition is not the same as the monotonicity of the





so the sum of the virtual type functions may be decreasing at some x while the virtual
match value function satis¯es local PS, and conversely the sum of the virtual type functions
may be increasing while the virtual match value function fails local PS.
In the simple price discrimination problem where the utility of a type equals the prod-
uct of the type and the assigned quality, monotonicity of the virtual type is necessary for
a strictly increasing quality schedule to be optimal. Although in the special case where
the two sides have the same type distribution our conclusion coincides with the standard
monotonicity condition, the logic is di®erent between the two models. In the price dis-
crimination problem, monotonicity of the virtual type is equivalent to monotonicity of the
solution to the pointwise maximization problem. Since the monotonicity constraint on
the quality schedule is dropped in the pointwise maximization problem, monotonicity of
the virtual type is necessary for the solution to be incentive compatible. In contrast, the
necessity of the local PS condition follows from a variational argument over the revenue
formula (equation 3.4), which respects the feasiblity constraint as well as the monotonicity
constraint on the quality schedules. Further, in the price discrimination problem, mono-
tonicity of the virtual type is also su±cient for the solution to the pointwise maximization
problem to be optimal. In the next subsection we explain why the local PS condition is
generally insu±cient for the perfect sorting to be optimal.
{ 22 {4.2. Su±cient conditions
By the proof of Proposition 4.2, failure of the local PS condition at any point on the
e±cient matching path implies that the monopoly matchmaker can increase the revenue
by pooling adjacent types into a single meeting place. However, the local PS does not
impose any constraint on the behavior of the virtual match value function away from a
small neighborhood of the e±cient matching path. As a result, it fails to ensure that
a greater revenue cannot be generated by pooling a large set of types. For the perfect
sorting to be optimal, the virtual match value function needs to satisfy a global version of
the necessary condition in Proposition 4.2. We say that the virtual match value function
K satis¯es \global" PS in the region (x1;x2)£(sm(x1);sm(x2)), if for any x; ~ x 2 (x1;x2),
K(x;sm(x)) + K(~ x;sm(~ x)) ¸ K(x;sm(~ x)) + K(~ x;sm(x)): (4:2)
When the above inequality holds with the strict sign we say that K satis¯es strict global
PS. Clearly, global PS implies local PS of Proposition 4.2: letting ~ x converge to x and sm(~ x)
converge to sm(x) in (4.2) and using the de¯nition of cross partial derivatives imply that
K12(x;sm(x)) ¸ 0. However, global PS is weaker than requiring that K be supermodular
in the region (x1;x2) £ (sm(x1);sm(x2)).16 Supermodularity requires that for any x; ~ x 2
(x1;x2) and y; ~ y 2 (sm(x1);sm(x2)) such that x · ~ x and y · ~ y,
K(x;y) + K(~ x; ~ y) ¸ K(x; ~ y) + K(~ x;y):
Instead, global PS only requires that the above inequality hold when (x;y) and (~ x; ~ y) are
on the e±cient matching path.
Proposition 4.3. If K satis¯es strict global PS in (x1;x2) £ (sm(x1);sm(x2)), then any
nondecreasing, feasible pair of quality schedules with (x1;x2) £ (sm(x1);sm(x2)) as the
interior of a maximal pooling region is non-optimal.
16 For general expositions of the concept of supermodularity and its economic applications, see Milgrom
and Roberts (1990), Topkis (1998), and Vives (1990).
{ 23 {Proof. Let ^ q = h^ qm; ^ qwi be a pair of nondecreasing and feasible quality schedules, with
(x1;x2)£(sm(x1);sm(x2)) as the interior of a maximal pooling region. Construct a pair of
quality schedule q¤ = hq¤
m;q¤
wi such that: i) q¤
m and q¤
w are identical to ^ qm and ^ qw outside
the maximal pooling intervals that contain (x1;x2) and (sm(x1);sm(x2)), respectively;
and ii) q¤
m(x) = sm(x) and q¤
w(sm(x)) = x for any x in the maximal pooling intervals that
contain (x1;x2) and (sm(x1);sm(x2)), respectively. By construction, q¤ is nondecreasing
and feasible. Let ¢ denote the revenue di®erence between q¤ and ^ q. Applying the revenue





































In a similar way, after two changes of variable x = sw(~ y) and y = sm(~ x), the second term


























which is strictly positive because K satis¯es strict global PS in the range of the integration.
Q.E.D.
The idea of the above proposition comes from the revenue formula in Proposition 3.6.
The revenue from perfectly sorting the types in the region (x1;x2)£(sm(x1);sm(x2)) is the
integral of the virtual match value function K along the segment of the e±cient matching
{ 24 {path f(x;sm(x))jx 2 (x1;x2)g, while the revenue from pooling the types is the integral of
K over the entire region. By changes of variables we can write the revenue di®erence ¢ as
one-half of the integral of the inequality (4.2) over the region.17
Proposition 4.3 establishes that if the virtual match value function K satis¯es global
PS in (x1;x2) £ (sm(x1);sm(x2)), perfectly sorting types in that region does better than
pooling the same types all together. This does not imply that the optimal sorting structure
calls for the perfect sorting in the region, because it may be optimal to have a larger pool
than (x1;x2) £ (sm(x1);sm(x2)). On the other hand, since by de¯nition global PS in a
region implies global PS in any subset of the region, if K satis¯es global PS everywhere,
then the perfect sorting is optimal. Thus global PS over (cm;bm) £ (cw;bw) is a su±cient
condition for the optimality of the perfect sorting.
When global PS is satis¯ed, the fee schedules can be easily calculated. Since
pm(x) = xsm(x) ¡ Um(x);
using condition (3.2) and the perfect sorting condition qm(x) = sm(x), we have




where cm is the cuto® type for the male side. A similar expression holds for the female fee
schedule pw:




Note that pm and pw are continuous. This property holds only when the perfect sorting
is optimal. In general any pooling will make the quality schedule discontinuous. Since the
indirect utility functions are necessarily continuous, the fee schedules will be discontinuous
at the boundaries of each maximal pooling region. Note also that the total revenue from
the two sides along the e±cient matching path (x;sm(x)) is
pm(x) + pw(sm(x)) = 2xsm(x) ¡ Um(x) ¡ Uw(sm(x)):
17 The proof of Proposition 4.3 also provides a direct argument of Proposition 4.2. If K12(x;sm(x)) < 0
for all x 2 (x1;x2), then any nondecreasing, feasible pair of quality schedules that perfectly sorts types
in any subset of the region (x1;x2) £ (sm(x1);sm(x2)) is non-optimal. We choose to present the original
proof of Proposition 4.2 because it is constructive and illustrates the local nature of the necessary condition
for the perfect sorting to be optimal.




m(x) = sm(x) + xs0
m(x);
which is one-half of the rate of increase of the total match value 2xsm(x).
Proposition 4.3 suggests that when the virtual match value function K satis¯es global
PS in some region (x1;x2) £ (sm(x1);sm(x2)), breaking up the region into su±ciently
many small pooling regions generates more revenue than pooling all types in (x1;x2) £
(sm(x1);sm(x2)) together.18 However, global PS does not guarantee that dividing the
market into meeting places always increases the revenue. The next proposition establishes
that supermodularity of K is su±cient for this stronger result.19 This monotone conver-
gence result is useful in practice because it implies that setting up a new meeting place
always strictly increases revenue. It also illustrates a di®erence between supermodularity
and global PS.
Proposition 4.4. Let q¤ be a pair of nondecreasing, feasible quality schedules with
(x1;x2) £ (sm(x1);sm(x2)) as the interior of a maximal pooling region. If K is (strictly)
supermodular on (x1;x2) £ (sm(x1);sm(x2)), then for any t 2 (x1;x2), any pair of non-
decreasing, feasible quality schedules ^ q such that ^ q is identical to q¤ outside [x1;x2] £
[sm(x1);sm(x2)] and ^ q has (x1;t) £ (sm(x1);sm(t)) and (t;x2) £ (sm(t);sm(x2)) as the
interiors of two maximal pooling regions generates (strictly) more revenue than q¤.
Proof. Let the revenue di®erence between ^ q and q¤ be ¢. Using the revenue formula























18 In an earlier version of the paper, we show that the revenue from perfectly sorting types in
any region (x1;x2) £ (sm(x1);sm(x2)), can be approximated by breaking up the intervals (x1;x2) and
(sm(x1);sm(x2)) in a ¯nite number of su±ciently small pooling intervals.
19 An implication is that increasing the number of meeting places always strictly increases match e±-
ciency in terms of total match value. This can be seen by replacing K with the match value function xy
in the proof of Proposition 4.4 below and noting that by assumption the match value function satis¯es
supermodularity.
















Next, apply the change of variables Fh(x) = Fl(~ x) to x in the second integral and in the
fourth integral, and Gh(y) = Gl(~ y) to y in the second integral and in the third integral.


















The above is (strictly) positive because F
¡1
h (Fl(x)) > x; G
¡1
h (Gl(y)) > y and K is (strictly)
supermodular on (x1;x2) £ (sm(x1);sm(x2)). Q.E.D.
The idea behind Proposition 4.4 is to write the revenue di®erence ¢ between sorting
the types in (x1;x2) £ (sm(t1);sm(t2)) into two meeting places and pooling all types in
the region, as the integral of the inequality (4.2) where x varies between x1 and t and
correspondingly y between sm(x1) and sm(t). This is achieved by a change of variables.
Note that other changes of variables would also work. For example, one can de¯ne new
integration variables by setting Fh(~ x) = 1 ¡ Fl(x) and Gh(~ y) = 1 ¡ Gl(y). The proof of
the proposition proceeds in a similar fashion; the only di®erence is that for each x 2 [x1;t],
inequality (4.2) applies to a di®erent set of four points.
Equation (4.4) implies that a necessary condition for (x1;x2) £ (sm(x1);sm(x2)) to
be the interior of a maximal pooling region is that there does not exist a point (t;sm(t))
on the e±cient matching path contained in the region such that the virtual match value
function is \on average" supermodular at the point. An implication of this result is that
if the matchmaker can create at least two meeting places, it would never be optimal to
pool all men and women into a single market. This follows because regardless of the type
{ 27 {distributions, the virtual type functions Jm and Jw eventually become increasing towards
the end of the e±cient matching path and reach their respective maximum at the end. This
in turn implies that there is always a point (t;sm(t)) such that the virtual type functions
satisfy minx¸t Jm(x) ¸ maxx·t Jm(x) and miny¸sm(t) Jw(y) ¸ maxy·sm(t) Jw(y), and
therefore the virtual match value function is supermodular on average at (t;sm(t)). At
this point it would increase the revenue to split the market into two pools.
4.3. Path supermodularity and supermodularity
Supermodularity can be substantially stronger than path supermodularity. When the













Thus, when the minimum of J0
m(x) and the minimum of J0
w(y) are achieved at a point
(x;y) on the e±cient matching path, the above two conditions coincide. This is the case
when the e±cient matching path sm(x) is linear, including the special case where F and











When sm is linear, if the minimum of J0
m is achieved at some x, then sm(x) minimizes J0
w.
In this case, there is no di®erence between supermodularity and local or global PS.
A linear e±cient matching path occurs only when the distribution of type on one side
of the market is the same as the distribution of a linear transformation of type on the
other side. In general, however, the virtual match value function K can satisfy local PS
but fail to be supermodular. The following example illustrates the di®erence between the
two concepts. Let am = aw = 0 and bm = bw = 1, and ¯x 0 < ± < 1 and 0 < z < 1
2. Type





z (z ¡ x) if x · z
± +
2(1¡±)





1¡z y if y · 1 ¡ z
± +
2(1¡±)
z (1 ¡ y) if y > 1 ¡ z.
Note that the density function of male type is bimodal with a trough at z, while the
density function of female type is single-peaked at 1 ¡ z. See panel (a) of Figure 1.
When ± approaches 1, the two type distributions become identical (and uniform between
0 and 1) and the e±cient matching path is the main diagonal in the type space. As ±
decreases, the type distributions become more dissimilar and the e±cient matching path
moves further above the diagonal for x < 1
2 and further below the diagonal for x > 1
2.
See panel (b) of Figure 1. Note that sm(z) < 1 ¡ z. It is straightforward to verify
the following properties of the virtual type functions: J00
m(x) < 0 for x 2 [0;z), J0
m is
discontinuous at z with limx"z J0
m(x) < limx#z J0
m(x), and J0
m(x) > 0, J00
m(x) < 0 for
x 2 (z;1]; J0
w(y) > 0, J00
w(y) < 0 for y 2 [0;1 ¡ z), J0
w is discontinuous at 1 ¡ z with
limy"1¡z J0
w(y) > limy#1¡z J0
w(y), and J0
w(y) > 0 and J00
w(y) > 0 for y 2 (1 ¡ z;1]. Given







w(y) > 0; (4:5)





w(sm(z)) > 0 (4:6)
is both necessary and su±cient. The latter claim follows from the fact that J0
m(x) +
J0
w(sm(x)) is decreasing for all x 2 [0;z), and that J0
m(x)+J0
w(sm(x)) > 0 for x 2 (z;1].21
Moreover, since sm(z) < 1 ¡ z, J00
w(y) < 0 for y 2 [0;1 ¡ z), and limy"1¡z J0
w(y) >
limy#1¡z J0
w(y), we have J0
w(sm(z)) > limy#1¡z J0
w(y) for any ±. When ± is close to 1,
20 We have required the type density function f and g to be di®erentiable, but di®erentiability almost
everywhere, which holds in the example, is su±cient for our analysis.
21 At x = sw(1 ¡ z), J0
w(sm(x)) is not de¯ned but both the left and the right derivatives are positive.
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both inequality (4.5) and inequality (4.6) are satis¯ed, because the two type distributions
become uniform with linear increasing virtual types. When ± is close to 0, both inequality
(4.5) and inequality (4.6) are violated, because limx"z J0
m(x) decreases without bound while
J0
w is bounded. Since the left-hand-side of each inequality is continuous in ±, there exists
an intermediate values of ± such that K is not supermodular but satis¯es local PS.
An interesting issue is how changes in parameters of the model such as character-
istics of the match value function and the type distributions a®ect the supermodular or
PS properties of K. To explore this issue, consider monotone transformations of the
type distribution on one side of the market, say, the male side. Let ¿ be an increasing,
twice-di®erentiable function and denote ~ x = ¿(x). This transformation can be inter-
preted as a comparative statics exercise where the male type distribution changes from
F(x) to ~ F(~ x) with ~ F(¢) = F(¿¡1(¢)) (and correspondingly the density function becomes
~ f(¢) = f(¿¡1(¢))=¿0(¿¡1(¢))) while the match value function remains ~ xy. An equivalent
interpretation is a comparative static exercise where the match value function changes
from xy to ¿(x)y while the type distributions remain to be F and G. If we adopt the ¯rst
interpretation, then the derivative of the virtual male type function becomes
~ J0







{ 30 {where x = ¿¡1(~ x). Thus, when ¿ is linear with ¿00 = 0, the new virtual match value
function has the same supermodular or local PS properties of the original K. These linear
transformations generally change the variance of the type distribution on the male side;
for example, the variance increases if the slope of ¿ is greater than 1. Thus, an implication
is that changes in variances of type distributions do not necessarily make it more or less
likely for the perfect sorting to be optimal. In contrast, when ¿ is convex (concave), the
perfect sorting is less (more) likely to be optimal. Intuitively, a convex ¿ means that the
new density function ~ f, and hence the new virtual male type function, is less likely to
be increasing (recall that ~ f(¢) = f(¿¡1(¢))=¿0(¿¡1(¢))). In the alternative interpretation
of monotone transformations as changes in the match value function, we have that for
¯xed type distributions, all match value functions of the form ¿m(x)¿w(y) have the same
supermodular and path supermodular properties for the virtual match value functions if
¿m and ¿w are linear. On the other hand, a change of the match value function from xy to
x2y would make it less likely for the perfect sorting to be optimal. Thus, the monopolist
has less incentive to perfectly sort types when returns to scale in the match value function
are higher.
5. Discussions
So far we have considered conditions for the perfect sorting to be optimal under two
substantive assumptions about the reservation utility. First, we have assumed that the
reservation utility is the same for the two sides of the market. This assumption can
be easily dispensed without a®ecting the supermodularity and the path supermodularity
properties of the virtual match value function. Given any exclusion policy (i.e. cuto®
types cm and cw such that cw = sm(cm)), the solution to the optimal sorting problem is
independent of the reservation utilities, because the only change to the objective function
(the revenue formula 3.4) is the addition of two constant terms ¡Um(1 ¡ F(cm)) and
¡Uw(1 ¡ G(cw)), where Um and Uw are the reservation utility for men and for women
respectively. Thus, the conditions for the perfect sorting to be optimal will not change.22
22 Asymmetric reservation utilities will in general change the optimal exclusion policy. For example it
might be optimal to charge a negative price to the cuto® type on the side with a higher reservation utility
in order to induce greater participation and extract more rent from the other side.
{ 31 {The second assumption is that the reservation utility is type independent. However,
higher types may have better outside options. This can be captured by assuming that
men and women excluded from the monopolist's mechanism can randomly match among
each other for free. In this case the reservation utility of a type is the type's expected
payo® from joining the free pool, and is endogenously determined by the exclusion policy
of the monopolist. Under any feasible, incentive compatible market structure, the types
that participate in the free pool are determined by a cuto® rule, with only men and women
below the respective cuto® types participating in the free pool. This is because the free
pool corresponds to a participation fee of zero, so it cannot be optimal for the monopolist
to create a meeting place with a quality lower than the quality of the free pool. Further, as
in the case of exogenous type-independent reservation utility, the fees for the types served
by the matchmaker are determined by the usual incentive compatibility constraints, rather
than by the participation constraint that these types have to get as much utility from the
matchmaker as from the free pool, even though higher types receive more utility from the
free pool. This latter claim follows from the fact the indirect utility of a type x above
the cuto® increases at the rate of qm(x) (equation 3.2), while the utility from the free
pool increases at the rate of the conditional mean of female types below the cuto®, which
is lower than qm(x). Thus, for any exclusion policy or a pair of cuto® types cm and
cw, the introduction of the free pool (with the utility for unmatched agents remaining
zero) changes the objective function (the revenue formula 3.4) by adding two constants
¡cm¹w(aw;cw)(1¡F(cm)) and ¡cw¹m(am;cm)(1¡G(cw)). This means that the solution
to the optimal sorting problem does not change as a result of endogenous reservation utility,
and the conditions for the perfect sorting to be optimal remain unchanged.23
An important assumption in our model is that the match value function is multi-
plicatively separable. Without this assumption, the payo® to an agent from a random
pairwise matching in a meeting place generally depends on the entire type distribution of
23 Endogenous reservation utilities will a®ect the monopolist's exclusion policy. For example, when
the type distributions are symmetric and the common virtual type function J(t) crosses zero only once,
one can show that a free pool forces the matchmaker to increase market coverage. This follows because
to counter the competition by the free pool, the matchmaker needs to admit more types at the bottom of
the distribution so as to reduce the outside option for the participating types.
{ 32 {participants from the other side. This means that the monopolist problem of designing the
sorting structure Á cannot be reduced to be a one-dimensional problem of choosing quality
schedules q. In place of equations (3.1), the monopolist has to choose a pair of \match
schedules" ®m and ®w, with ®m(x) representing the distribution of female types on the
match set Ám(x) for male type x. The key to the weak sorting result of Proposition 3.5
is the monotonicity condition on the quality schedule, but there is no counterpart to this
ordering with a non-separable match value function because ®m(x) is a multi-dimensional
object. Thus the weak sorting result does not obtain, and we cannot further reduce the
monopolist problem of designing the sorting structure to choosing the break points of
maximal pooling intervals. However, if one is willing to assume weak sorting, then we can
derive an analogous expression for the revenue formula of Proposition 3.6, and identify
necessary and su±cient conditions for the perfect sorting to be optimal in the same way
as in section 4.
More precisely, suppose that the match value function is v(x;y) with positive cross
partial derivatives. Following standard arguments, we can show that ®m(x)v1(x;y) be-
ing nondecreasing is necessary for the incentive compatibility constraints for men, where
®m(x)v1(x;y) denotes the expectation with respect to ®m(x) over y 2 Ám(x) of v1(x;y),
the partial derivative of v with respect to the ¯rst argument. Note that this necessary
condition is satis¯ed under weak sorting, because the match schedule ®m is ordered by
¯rst order stochastic dominance and v1(x;y) is increasing in y by assumption. Further, if
we de¯ne the indirect utility function Um as
Um(x) = ®m(x)v(x;y) ¡ pm(x);
where ®m(x)v(x;y) represents the expectation of v(x;y) with respect to ®m(x) over y 2
Ám(x), then Um(x) satis¯es the envelope condition
U0
m(x) = ®m(x)v1(x;y);
at every x such that the right-hand-side of the condition is continuous, which is everywhere
except for the break points of the maximal pooling intervals.24 The envelope condition
24 For any x in a sorting interval, ®m(x)v1(x;y) is equal to v1(x;sm(x)), which is continuous in x, while
for any x in the interior of a maximal pooling interval Tm, ®m(x)v1(x;y) is equal to the expected value of
v1(x;y) over y on ©m(Tm), which is continuous on the interval Tm.
{ 33 {and the monotonicity condition can be shown to be su±cient for incentive compatibility.
Then, as in section 3, we obtain the same revenue formula as (3.4), with the virtual match
value function K rede¯ned as
K(x;y) = v(x;y) ¡ v1(x;y)
1 ¡ F(x)
f(x)




The results on necessary and su±cient conditions for the optimality of the perfect sorting
apply with no change.
An assumption complementary to multiplicative separability of the match value func-
tion is that agents are randomly matched within each meeting place. Without the as-
sumption of random matching, the expected quality of a match in a meeting place may be
type dependent and determined by the entire distribution of types in the meeting place.
In this case, the expected payo®s from joining a meeting place would not be multiplica-
tively separable even if the match value function is, and this would create the same kind of
analytical di±culties as discussed earlier. For example, if instead of one round of random
matching we have sequential search as in Burdett and Coles (1997) or in Damiano, Li and
Suen (forthcoming), the expected match quality for any type in a meeting place depends
on which \class" the type belongs to. Moreover, the class structure is endogenously de-
termined by the type distributions in the meeting place. How to incorporate sequential
search into the framework of price discrimination is an interesting and challenging topic
that deserves further research.
Appendix
A.1. Proof of Lemma 4.1















{ 34 {Then, ¢t(²) = Rt(²) ¡ ^ Rt(²). Clearly, we have ¢t(0) = 0. We are going to take derivative
with respect to ² of Rt(²) and ^ Rt(²), and study the di®erence as ² goes to zero.
For the ¯rst derivatives, let
At(²) = sm(~ t)Jm(~ t) + (~ t)Jw(sm(~ t)):
We have
R0
t(²) = f(~ t)At(²):
Next, we have
^ R0













w(sm(t);sm(~ t)) denotes the derivative of ¹w(sm(t);sm(~ t)) with respect to the sec-
ond argument, and similarly ¹0
m(t;~ t) denotes the derivative of ¹m(t;~ t) with respect to the
second argument. Let
^ At(²)¹w(sm(t);sm(~ t))Jm(~ t) + ¹m(t;~ t)Jw(sm(~ t))
+ (sm(~ t) ¡ ¹w(sm(t);sm(~ t)))Jm(t;~ t) + (~ t ¡ ¹m(t;~ t))Jw(sm(t);sm(~ t));
where Jm(t;~ t) =
R ~ t
t Jm(x) dF(x) and Jw(sm(t);sm(~ t)) =
R sm(~ t)
sm(t) Jw(y) dG(y). We can
write
^ R0
t(²) = f(~ t) ^ At(²):
It is easy to see that At(0) = ^ At(0); therefore, ¢0
t(0) = 0.
Now consider the second derivative:
R00
t (²) = f0(~ t)At(²) + f(~ t)A0
t(²);
^ R00
t (²) = f0(~ t) ^ At(²) + f(~ t) ^ A0
t(²):
Taking derivatives, we have
A0
t(²) = s0
m(~ t)Jm(~ t) + sm(~ t)J0







m(t) + Jw(sm(t)) + tJ0
w(sm(t))s0
m(t):




m(~ t)Jm(~ t) + J0




m(~ t) + (sm(~ t) ¡ ¹w(sm(t);sm(~ t)))J0
m(t;~ t)
+ (1 ¡ ¹0
m(t;~ t))Jw(sm(t);sm(~ t)) + (s0
m(~ t) ¡ ¹0
w(sm(t);sm(~ t))s0
m(~ t))Jm(t;~ t)




m(t;~ t) denotes the derivative of Jm(t;~ t) with respect to the second argument, and
J0
w(sm(t);sm(~ t)) similarly denotes the derivative of Jw(sm(t);sm(~ t)) with respect to the



















t (0) = 0.
We are led to compute the third derivatives of ¢t(²):
R000
t (²) = f00(~ t)At(²) + 2f0(t + ²)A0
t(²) + f(~ t)A00
t (~ t);
^ R000
t (²) = f00(~ t) ^ At(²) + 2f0(~ t) ^ A0
t(²) + f(~ t) ^ A00
t (~ t):



















































This completes the proof of the lemma. Q.E.D.
{ 36 {References
Becker, G. (1981), A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Bergemann, D. and M. Pesendorfer (2001), \Information Structures in Optimal Auctions,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper, No. 1323, Yale University.
Bloch, F. and H. Ryder (2000), \Two-sided Search, Marriages, and Matchmakers," Inter-
national Economic Review 41, 93{115.
Burdett, K. and M. Coles (1997), \Marriage and Class," Quarterly Journal of Economics
112, 141-168.
Damiano, E., H. Li and W. Suen, \Unraveling of Dynamic Sorting," forthcoming Review
of Economic Studies.
Damiano, E. and H. Li (2004), \Competing Matchmaking," mimeo, University of Toronto.
Inderst, R. (2001), \Screening in a Matching Market," Review of Economic Studies 68,
849{868.
McAfee, R.P. (2002), \Coarse Matching," Econometrica 70, 2025{2034.
Maskin, E. and J. Riley (1984), \Monopoly with incomplete information," Rand Journal
of Economics 15, 171{196.
Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1990), \Rationalizability and Learning in Games with Strate-
gic Complementarities," Econometrica 58, 1255{1277.
Morgan, P. (1995), \A Model of Search, Coordination, and Market Segmentation," mimeo,
State University of New York at Bu®alo.
Mussa, M. and S. Rosen (1978), \Monopoly and Product Quality," Journal of Economic
Theory 18, 301{317.
Myerson, R. (1981), \Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research 6,
58{73.
Rayo, L. (2002), \Monopolistic Signal Provision," mimeo, Stanford University.
Smith, L. (2002), \The Marriage Market with Frictions," mimeo, University of Michigan.
Topkis, D.M. (1998), Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press.
Vives, X. (1990), \Nash Equilibrium with Strategy Complementarities," Journal of Math-
ematical Economics 19, 305{321.
{ 37 {